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Abstract. Errors and anomalies during the capture and processing of health data 
have the potential to place personally identifiable values into attributes of a dataset 
that are expected to contain non-identifiable values.  Anonymisation focuses on 
those attributes that have been judged to enable identification of individuals.  
Attributes that are judged to contain non-identifiable values are not considered, but 
may be included in datasets that are shared by organisations.  Consequently, 
organisations are at risk of sharing datasets that unintendedly disclose personally 
identifiable values through these attributes.  This would have ethical and legal 
implications for organisations and privacy implications for individuals whose 
personally identifiable values are disclosed.  In this paper, we formulate the problem 
of unintended disclosure following anonymisation, describe the necessary steps to 
address this problem, and discuss some key challenges to applying these steps in 
practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Personally identifiable data [14] is captured and processed by care providers to inform 
service provision (e.g. emergency treatment).  Simultaneously, these organisations are 
increasingly incentivised or mandated to share datasets with other organisations, or to 
make data available publicly, for secondary uses (e.g. clinical research) [15]. 
Legislation and ethical guidance governs data sharing by organisations.  Generic 
legislation such as the Data Protection Act [19] and Human Rights Act [20] applies in 
the UK.  Specific legislation also exists for the health domain, including the National 
Health Service Act 2006 [21] and Health and Social Care Act [22] in the UK, and the 
Health Information Portability Act (HIPAA) [23] in the US.  Ethical guidance from 
advisory groups such as Research Ethics Committees [9] may supplement legislation. 
Anonymisation can be applied to datasets prior to sharing in order to comply with 
legislation and ethical guidance.  Attributes in a dataset are classified by the extent to 
which they facilitate identification of a ``data subject'' [11].  Risk of identification [6] 
posed by values in specific sets of attributes is then quantified using methods such as k-
anonymity [18], l-diversity [13] and β-likeness [4].  Values are transformed [8, 17] to 
reduce this risk below an acceptable threshold [10] for a specific context. 
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Human judgements are used to classify attributes as: direct identifiers: judged to 
enable identification in isolation, indirect identifiers: judged to enable identification in 
conjunction with other attributes within or outside the dataset, or non-identifiers: judged 
to provide minimal risk of identification [14].  Attribute classification, along with 
considerations of computational tractability [3, 7] and data utility [2, 16], determine 
whether specific attributes are included in: i) the anonymisation process, and ii) the 
shared dataset. 
Classification requires knowledge of how attribute values contribute to 
identification.  Legal and ethical guidance documents [10, 23] provide pre-defined 
classifications of common attributes (e.g. Surname) to assist organisations.  However, 
datasets to be shared may exhibit characteristics such as high-dimensionality [1], 
structural dynamism, and complex provenance.  Consequently, classification decisions 
may be based on incomplete and/or imperfect knowledge regarding attributes and their 
values.  Failure of human judgements when making these type of information security 
decisions [5, 25], particularly in the evaluation of risk and uncertainty [24], and the 
consequences in terms of security and privacy breaches [12] has been previously 
recognised. 
We focus on a problem that may arise from errors and anomalies during the capture 
and processing of health data: personally identifiable values being placed into attributes 
of a dataset whose values are expected to contain non-identifiable data.  For example, a 
unique patient identifier residing in an attribute that relates to the reason for a referral 
due to an erroneous processing step that transposes values between attributes, or an 
informal staff policy to increase the speed of internal processes.  Such attributes may be 
judged to contain non-identifiable values and omitted from anonymisation, but then 
included in a shared dataset.  Consequently, organisations are at risk of sharing datasets 
that unintendedly disclose personally identifiable values through these attributes. 
2. Unintended Disclosure of Personally Identifiable Data 
We model a dataset as a set of entries, ? ? ?, where each entry is a tuple, ???? ? ? ???, 
that is composed of values for a set of attributes, ?? ? ? ??????? ???, that relate to an 
individual, and ???represents the set of distinct values held by an attribute, ? ? ?. 
 
Patient Number Date Source Reason 
1120000 2014-04-01 ABC123 Cancer 
Figure 1. Example entry from a dataset relating to patient referrals 
Attributes are classified into one of the following distinct subsets of A to drive the 
anonymisation process: direct identifiers (I), indirect identifiers (Q), and non-identifiers 
(N), such that ? ? ? ? ? ? ?.  Direct identifiers, ? ? ?, are removed.  Non-identifiers, 
? ? ?, are not considered in the anonymisation process, but may included in a shared 
dataset.  We assume that at least one attribute is classified as a non-identifier, such that 
???? ? ?.  Indirect identifiers, ? ? ?, are considered in anonymisation.  For simplicity, 
and without loss of generality, we consider anonymisation to be applied over all 
attributes in Q rather than a subset of these attributes.   Risk of identification is quantified 
based on combinations of values for the indirect identifiers, ???? ??????? ? ??? ? ? for each 
entry in the dataset. 
Transformations are applied to values of indirect identifiers to reduce the risk of 
identification.  Specific transformations are dependent on the syntax and semantics of 
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attribute values.  We do not consider aggregation over entries as a transformation, such 
that each entry remains associated with a single individual following anonymisation.  
Organisations iterate over a process of risk quantification and transformation to produce 
a dataset where the: i) risk of identification is reduced below an acceptable threshold, ii) 
data utility is sufficient for the intended use(s). 
 
PID Date Source Reason 
1 2014-04 Specialist Clinic Cancer 
Figure 2. Example anonymised entry from a dataset relating to patient referrals 
Figure 2 illustrates how the entry in Figure 1 might be anonymised.  Patient No has 
been classified as a direct identifier and replaced by a unique (non-personal) identifier: 
PID.  Reason has been classified as a non-identifier and retained in the dataset without 
transformation.  Date and Source have been classified as indirect identifiers and 
transformed using generalisation. 
Unintended disclosure of personally identifiable data has the potential to arise from 
judgements regarding attribute classification that are based on an expectation of the set 
of values, ?????, held by the attribute, a, rather than the actual set of values, ??.  For 
example, the expectation that Reason will contain values that only relate to the condition 
for which they have been referred.  Inconsistency between the expected and actual values 
can lead to an attribute that poses an identification risk being classified as a non-identifier 
and omitted from the anonymisation process.  Actual values that contain personally 
identifiable data, such as Patient No, may reside in attributes classified as non-identifiers. 
 
PID Date Source Reason 
1 2014-04 Specialist Clinic Cancer-1120000 
Figure 3. Example anonymised entry from a dataset relating to patient referrals with unintended disclosure 
Figure 3 illustrates the problem of unintended disclosure.  Patient No been included 
in the Reason attribute.  Due to the classification of the Reason attribute as a non-
identifier - based on the expectation that any values held by the attribute posed a minimal 
risk to identification - the attribute has been included in the dataset without 
transformation but clearly poses an identification risk. 
Validation at different processing stages using techniques such as regular 
expressions may fail to prevent such scenarios.  Methods may not be sufficiently 
restrictive due to their focus on the syntax rather than semantics of values.  Additionally, 
datasets may be composed of entries from different organisations, which are subject to 
heterogeneous policies regarding data quality.  Validation of these aggregated datasets 
might be insufficiently restrictive due to assumptions about upstream policies, or due to 
additional constraints, such as computational tractability. 
3.Preventing Unintended Disclosure of Personally Identifiable Data 
Prevention of unintended disclosure requires attributes to be classified based on 
verification rather than expectation of values.  Verification ensures that any value,  
? ? ??, of any attribute, ? ? ?, within any entry is drawn from a pre-defined set of values, 
???, for which the absence of personally identifiable data can be demonstrated.  Any entry 
in the dataset would then be drawn from a defined space: ????
? ???? ????
? ? ??? ? ? .  
Verification could be integrated into attribute classification as follows: 
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 For ? ? ? , a set of values would be defined, ??? , which are drawn from a 
vocabulary for which the semantics and implications for identification of 
individuals are known, e.g. ???????? ? ???????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ? ? ? ?. 
 For ? ? ?, the set of actual values held by the attribute, Va, across all tuples 
would be determined, e.g. ??????? ? ?????????? ????????? ? ? ? ?. 
 For ? ? ?? ? ???, a transformation function, ?, would be defined, to map actual 
values, Va, of an attribute to values in V*a.  Values not mapped would be 
omitted, or replaced with a null value, e.g. ??????????? ? ??????? ??????. 
 Classification would partition the set of attributes, A, based on known semantics 
of the extent to which they enable the identification of individuals, e.g. ? ?
????????? ??, ? ? ?????? ???????, and ? ? ????????. 
Verification would not only assist in preventing unintended disclosure, it would also 
provide a robust basis on which the identification risk posed by the values of different 
attributes could be quantified.  Computational tractability and data utility could still be 
retained by evaluating identification risk over a subset of the attributes, Q.  However, 
verification would ensure that classification of an attribute as a non-identifier does not 
risk the disclosure of personally identifiable data. 
Classification based on verification of their actual values rather than human 
judgement is particularly important given the high-dimensionality, structural dynamism 
and complex provenance of datasets now captured by organisations.  Robust judgement 
in the presence of such factors is a significant challenge for humans, yet such judgements 
are likely to be required more frequently within organisations in the future. 
4.Challenges 
Prevention of unintended disclosure presents challenges in practice, which include: 
 Computational Overhead: Verification of attribute values against pre-defined 
sets is computationally intensive - requiring potentially vast numbers of 
comparisons.  Efficient methods are required to minimise the time and 
resources required 
 Structural Dynamism: Attributes and sets of attribute values can be subject to 
change over time - requiring changes to the verification process to ensure that 
it remains effective. 
 Vocabularies: Attribute values must be compared against a pre-defined set of 
values - requiring relevant vocabularies to exist for each attribute.  
Organisations may be required to author such vocabularies if an appropriate 
vocabulary does not pre-exist for a particular attribute. 
 Technical Expertise: Mapping of actual values, Va, to a pre-defined set of 
values from a specific vocabulary, V*a, may not not necessarily be one-to-one 
and processing of certain formats for values may not be readily automated - 
requiring human involvement and technical expertise. 
Without effective and efficient solutions to these challenges, organisations must 
decide whether to: (1) avoid sharing of datasets, or (2) share anonymised datasets and 
acknowledge the risk of unintended disclosure.  This decision would be largely 
influenced by the legislative and ethical frameworks to which the organisation is subject. 
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5.Conclusion 
Unintended disclosure of personally identifiable data has regulatory implications and 
poses governance challenges for data controllers.  To situate sharing on a sound legal 
and ethical foundation, work is required to address the challenges above through novel 
tools and methods, vocabularies and ontologies, and education regarding anonymisation. 
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